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The threat of bankruptcy may be a new source of competitive
advantage in post-recession urban politics
While Detroit’s bankruptcy has received the most publicity, it was only one of many cities unable
to pay their bills in the aftermath of the 2008 financial collapse. Mark Davidson explains how the
landscape of urban politics has been redrawn in the wake of the Great Recession. He writes that
the role of the state in municipal affairs has greatly expanded and that the threat of bankruptcy,
once viewed as an exceptional measure, is now being used as gainful method of reducing public
pension obligations and solving deficit problems.
Speculation is well entrenched in municipal politics; cities must compete for resources such as
federal grants, private capital, charitable and foundational funding, creative professionals, state infrastructure
projects etc. In order to compete, cities must speculate by putting public funds into various magnet projects. This
speculative urban regime guarantees winners and losers, but the list of losers recently grew as the financial crisis
pushed a varied set of cities into bankruptcy. The impact of isolated municipal financial meltdowns is now
resonating across the US urban system.
Even in boom times, losing in this game can prove devastating for the ill-prepared or mismanaged city. Missing
out on governmental or private investment means fewer jobs, lower fiscal incomes and ultimately a reduction in
municipal services to bare bones (or worse). In the absence of more redistributive federal policies, our
entrepreneurial urban system has, for the last 30 years, been re-inscribing and remaking geographies of poverty
and segregation with alarming efficiency. This is to say nothing new. Anyone who buys a home in the United
States knows the costs of entrepreneurial municipal “failure”. The knowledge is embedded in societal
understandings of neighborhood, schools, crime rates, poverty, race and class.
If our speculative urban system
punishes uncompetitive
municipalities in the good
economic times, how then does
it work in bad times? Since 2008,
we have been finding out. We
still have clear winners; rent
extracting functionaries in global
cities continue to enjoy boom
times. Reflecting this fact are
cities such as New York that are
home those industrial sectors
that profit from the perverse
global economic system.
The story of the losers is more
complicated. However, a general
understanding can be sketched
out using the example of the
biggest losers: cities that have
declared bankruptcy. It is these cities who have begun to redefine what failure means in our speculative urban
system.
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, it was generally accepted that cities were systemically mandated—via both
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governmental and financial arrangements—to balance their books. Cities with lower per capita fiscal incomes
simply had lower per capita expenditures. However, in cities that hooked their municipal budgets up to highly
cyclical income sources (i.e. property development or speculative financial tools), the financial crisis meant that
fiscal shortfalls could not be bridged by available forms of fiscal reform.
In the post-2008 period, this municipal financial failure first occurred in Vallejo, California. Left with a labor bill that
exceeded its total income, and revenues that fell in line with the housing market they largely relied on, the city
filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Subsequently, we have seen other cities file for Chapter 9, most notably Detroit,
Michigan. While the specifics of Detroit’s story differ from earlier Californian bankruptcies (San Bernardino,
Stockton, Vallejo), the same basic structural fiscal problem emerged. Recession meant (cyclical) incomes
declined, and (newly cyclical) expenditure obligations grew. In Detroit’s case, in 2005, Bank of America and
Merrill Lynch sold Kwarme Kilpatrick’s city government a pension restructuring deal that exposed it terribly to
interest rate fluctuations. When market conditions changed, this deal meant Detroit did not have the fiscal
capacity to deal with its burgeoning repayments.
The financial crisis therefore left cities like Vallejo and Detroit unable to pay their bills, even with very significant
reductions in state services. The short-term financial situation was catastrophic.
But this is not the end of the story. These admittedly idiosyncratic cases are redrawing the landscape of urban
politics in the following ways: (a) generating a “nuclear option” in municipal governance; (b) reasserting state
power in municipal affairs; and (c) creating new depths to neoliberal restructuring.
Prior to Vallejo’s bankruptcy,
Chapter 9 was an ineffective
route to solve long-term
structural fiscal problems. The
court-mediated process required
majority creditor approval of any
readjustment plan and,
therefore, other venues were
better suited to restructure
problematic long-term spending
obligations. Chapter 9 largely
served as a vehicle to resolve
investment failures. Most
Chapter 9 filings concern failed
enterprise or development
projects, not cities themselves.
The most notable exception to
this was Orange County’s 1994
bankruptcy, where the city’s
treasurer made risky derivatives
deals that went sour. The Vallejo ruling changed this. The court ruling in the Vallejo case opened up a route for
municipalities to restructure their debts without majority creditor approval. The potential gains in Chapter 9 (e.g.
significant fiscal restructuring and reduced debt obligations) have increased greatly.
Headline catching bankruptcies in California and Michigan have also drawn state governments into municipal
affairs. The form of this state involvement varies. In California, the state legislature has acted to put the brakes on
potential bankruptcy filings by introducing legislation requiring more mediation between debtors (e.g.
municipalities) and creditors (e.g. state pension authorities and public employees). In Michigan, the state
government was pivotal in allowing and ensuring Detroit’s Chapter 9 filing. Nationwide, state governments are
now (re)considering whether or not Chapter 9 filings should be (de)authorized. A significant amount of lobbying is
taking place by those eager for cities (and states!) to go bankrupt in order to reduce public pension obligations
and solve deficit problems.
A combination of a few municipal bankruptcies and widespread fiscal imbalances is generating a condition some
label “austerity urbanism”. With threats of defaults and bankruptcy, many cities are beginning to broach fiscal
issues that have been largely ignored for the past 30 years. Chief targets for reform are collective bargaining
agreements, bond repayments and retiree benefits. Exceptional circumstances have created a municipal
governance climate where certain state functions and expenditures that were once thought of as untouchable are
now fair game. In Vallejo, retiree health benefits were drastically cut. In Stockton and Detroit, many bondholders
will see penny returns on their dollars. In San Bernardino, state pension payments are being cut. These types of
reforms resonate across the nation, stretching the spectrum of political possibilities.
The speculative municipal system is therefore in turmoil. Growth, whether real or spectral, is no longer covering
the cracks. A new governmental terrain marked by extremes is being generated. In this scenario, bankruptcy, or
the threat thereof, could ironically be a new source of competitive advantage.
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